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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to present a methodology to identify risks in the
chemical product development process, including fortification of the failure mode
taxonomy by including chemical failures. This work will enable comprehensive risk
analysis in technology-based products that have a chemical based subsystem, such as
those used in the lithography process in the semiconductor industry. This research
broadened the failure mode taxonomy by identifying chemical failures from publications
in the semiconductor industry. These failures were analyzed to determine the rudimentary
failure modes in each case. The newly identified failure modes were added to the failure
mode taxonomy. The taxonomy was then verified by generating potential risks of a
chemical based product through the use of a case study. The case study analysis verified
the research by producing the failure mode listed in the publication.

v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Dr. Katie Grantham for her insights, guidance and understanding. Her
help focusing my high-paced industry experience to a methodical academic setting was
much appreciated.
Thanks also to Brewer Science, Inc. who supported my career through the process
and partially funded the studies.
Dr. Benjamin L. Dow and Dr. Susan L. Murray were both helpful in working with
my unusual schedule, and providing their knowledge and experience to strength and
critique this research, thanks for their support.
My wife Brandi has been a driving force behind my furthered education, and I
appreciate her patience and support.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
PUBLICATION THESIS OPTION................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS........................................................................................... viii
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. ix
SECTION
1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 1
PAPER
I. Chemical Failure Mode Addition to the Failure Mode Taxonomy ............................ 2
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction................................................................................................................ 2
Background ........................................................................................................ 4
OSHA PHAs ............................................................................................... 6
Chemical industry Risk Assessment Tools.............................................. 7
Contemporary Risk Assessment Tools .................................................... 8
Summary of Risk Tool Application Issues .............................................. 9
Chemical Failure Mode Taxonomy Addendum Methodology .......................... 9
Chemical Failure Mode Taxonomy Details ..................................................... 11
Gas Release............................................................................................... 11
Feature Failure .......................................................................................... 12
Defects ...................................................................................................... 13
Interface Failures ...................................................................................... 14
Case Study........................................................................................................ 17
Summary .......................................................................................................... 18
References ........................................................................................................ 18
II. Chemical Risk in Early Design (C-RED) ................................................................ 24
Abstract ............................................................................................................ 24
1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 24

vii
2 Background ................................................................................................... 26
2.1 Recent Material Failures ..................................................................... 26
2.2 OSHA Recommended PHAs .............................................................. 30
2.3 Additional Risk Assessment Tools Used In The Chemical Industry.. 31
2.4 Risk In Early Design........................................................................... 31
3 Applying The C-RED Method ...................................................................... 35
4 A Case Study ................................................................................................. 37
5 Summary ....................................................................................................... 39
6 References ..................................................................................................... 40
SECTION
2. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 46
VITA ................................................................................................................................ 47

viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

Page

PAPER I
1

Semiconductor transistor design .................................................................................. 4

2

Line collapse example................................................................................................ 13

3

Defect examples ......................................................................................................... 14

4

Scumming example .................................................................................................... 15

5

Footing example......................................................................................................... 16

6

Undercut example ...................................................................................................... 16

PAPER II
1

Photolithography process ........................................................................................... 26

2

Comparison of wire bonding and flip chip ................................................................ 27

3

Semiconductor transistor design ................................................................................ 28

4

Fever chart example ................................................................................................... 35

5

Functional model of the develop process................................................................... 38

6

Fever chart for case study .......................................................................................... 39

ix
LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

PAPER I
1

Chemical failure mode results.................................................................................... 11

PAPER II
1

Chemical failure mode taxonomy .............................................................................. 33

2

RED heuristics ........................................................................................................... 34

3

RED heuristics ........................................................................................................... 34

4

Severity table for chemicals and chemical processes ................................................ 36

5

C-RED report for case study ...................................................................................... 39

x
SECTION

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research was to present a methodology to identify risks in the
chemical product development process. Chemicals become materials and then parts that
combine to create value for the end user, and in many cases the product value comes
from the basic material design. Chemists and engineers make decisions when designing
new chemicals early in the design process. The effect of these decisions can be learned
through empirical testing, usually in the integration or prototype phase of design.
Waiting to learn the risks and their consequences later in the design process can be
expensive if design changes are needed. This is further emphasized if inexperienced
scientists and engineers are making the decisions early in the design process.
The semiconductor industry produces a large number of computer chips,
including microprocessors, to memory, to integrated circuits (ICs), system on a chip
(SOC), and more. The use of chips ranges from common home appliances, such as
dishwashers and microwaves, to more complex systems, such as, tablet computers and
servers. The microelectronic devices that power and control the larger electronic devices
incorporate several chemicals.
This connection of chemical design, their use in microelectronics and the long design
chain lead to this research. The goal was to both fortify the failure mode taxonomy to
also include chemical failures and then to present a methodology to identify risks in the
chemical product development process. This will enable comprehensive risk analysis in
technology based products, specifically focusing on the semiconductor industry.
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PAPER
I.

Chemical Failure Mode Addition to the Failure Mode Taxonomy
Carlton Washburn, Katie Grantham
Missouri University of Science and Technology,
1870 Miner Circle, Rolla, MO USA 65409

Abstract
The research objective of this paper is to fortify the failure mode taxonomy by
including chemical failures. This inclusion would enable comprehensive risk analysis in
technology-based products. As technology improves at an exponential rate, partially due
to chemical advances in the semiconductor industry, failure identification tools must keep
up with the pace. While the current version of the failure mode taxonomy does consider
multiple domains of failure, it does not include a comprehensive collection of chemical
failures. Therefore this taxonomy is insufficient for a large number of new products.
The research presented here includes identifying chemical failures from publications in
the semiconductor industry.

These failures were then analyzed to determine the

rudimentary failure modes in each case. Finally the newly identified failure modes were
added to the failure mode taxonomy. A case study is presented to demonstrate using the
updated failure mode taxonomy to identify both potential failures and product risks.
Introduction
The research objective of this paper is to fortify the failure mode taxonomy to also
include chemical failures, which will enable comprehensive risk analysis in technology
based products, specifically focusing on the semiconductor industry. The semiconductor
industry produces a large number of computer chips, including microprocessors, to
memory, to integrated circuits (ICs), system on a chip (SOC), and more. The use of chips
ranges from common home appliances, such as dishwashers and microwaves, to more
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complex systems, such as, tablet computers and servers. The broad use of computer
devices in modern society, coupled with a global market, supports the $323.3 billion
market worldwide [1].
The capability of a chip is associated with its processing speed. The release of more
sophisticated products depends on how fast chips operate. The rate of semiconductor
technology development is often modeled following Moore’s Law [2]. Moore’s law is a
model that states that every two years, the number of transistors on an individual chip
will double [2]. The semiconductor industry has followed this law for decades. Moore’s
law has subsequently driven a smaller, faster, cheaper approach to both chip design and
manufacturing.

Further, a smaller, faster, cheaper approach has been enabled by

advancements in both tools and materials for patterning devices. Much of the material
development has centered on chemicals and their use in the lithography process. The
lithography process, similar to a negative producing a photograph, produces the logic
patterns used to make devices. Fundamentally, lithography is a series of chemical
transformations that, together, create a pattern. This pattern is used in the manufacturing
of integrated circuits [3]. The smaller the patterns, the more transistors can be built in the
same area, thus increasing both the processing speed and the memory capacity [2].
However, these small patterns are susceptible to failures that are in the same small scale.
A gate oxide separates the gate terminal from both the source and the drain in a
transistor, thus serving as a dielectric (see Figure 1). A voltage is applied to the gate,
allowing electrons to flow from the source to the drain through a channel both between
the two and under the gate. If the gate oxide is too thin, electrons can channel through
the oxide to the gate, causing current to leak through the device, resulting in electrical
failure of the transistor. A dramatic example of a failure at a small scale is Intel’s recent
issue with the Sandy Bridge graphics processor chip. This chip failed due to a gate oxide
that was too thin, resulting in the current leaking [4]. In 2001 roughly 8 million chips
shipped from Intel were fabricated with a gate oxide that was too thin. This failure mode
cost Intel $300 million in lost sales and $700 million in repairs [4]. The failure of this
chip emphasizes how a failure can progress through the design process, consuming
resources until it is identified.
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Fig 1 Semiconductor transistor design
A variety of chemicals are used to make semiconductors. This paper focuses on
the failure modes of lithography process chemicals. Most advances in the lithography
process have come from researching the polymers used to make liquid chemicals that are
spin-coated onto a substrate [5, 3]. These chemicals range from photoresists, which are
photoactive coatings used to retain a pattern, bottom anti-reflective coatings (BARCs)
used to attenuate light, hardmasks used to transfer a pattern, and spin-on carbon (SOC)
layers that provide further pattern transfer capabilities [3].
Currently, the failure mode taxonomy addresses only mechanical and electrical
failures. Therefore, using it to guide risk assessment, as it is intended, cannot lead
engineers to predict such failures as the Sandy Bridge graphic chip failure.

To

understand risk and mitigate failures, the failure mode taxonomy must include chemical
failures. Academic publications were analyzed to identify both failure causes and modes
of chemical failures in the semiconductor industry to fortify the failure mode taxonomy
to include chemical failures.
Background
Several risk assessment methods are currently used in the chemical industry, some
of which are drawn from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
PSM standard Title 29 CFR 1910.119. This federal regulation requires chemical plants
to conduct process hazards analysis (PHA) [6]. PHAs are methodologies that follow
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systematic approaches to find both hazards and deviations, and are defined by OSHA as a
systematic effort designed to identify the significance of hazards associated with either
the processing or handling of highly hazardous materials [6].

The regulation also

includes a PHA as a method to provide information, which will help both employers and
employees make decisions that will improve safety [6]. Along with OSHA, many other
entities have PHA guidance. These entities are detailed in government regulations such
as 21 CFR 120.7, 29 CFR 1910.119, 40 CFR 68, FAA-DI-SAFT-101, DOT-FTA-MA26-5005-00-01 and DOE Order 5480.30.
During the research, focus was placed on PHAs documented either under OSHA
regulations or used within the industry. The PHAs examined in this study, taken from
OSHA, included fault tree analysis (FTA), hazard and operability study (HazOp) and
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). These methods are listed by OSHA as tools
that can be used in industry to assist in both determining and understanding hazards and
potential failure modes in a chemical process [6]. Fault tree analysis is a quantitative
method that uses binary logic to understand how a failure propagation occurs [7, 8]. A
hazard and operability study, or a hazard and operability review, targets chemical
production processes; these studies are semi-quantitative [9, 10]. FMEA is a quantitative
method designed for products with several parts, such as automobiles [11]. FMEA in
particular is very common in the semiconductor industry because semiconductor devices
are used in automobiles, and for many years there has been a drive to follow standards
connected to the automotive industry, including FMEA recommendations [11].
Additional risk assessment tools used in industry, such as event tree analysis,
layer of protection analysis, and risk in early design, were also reviewed. These risk
analysis methods have published use in industry, addressing some of the limitations of
the OSHA listed PHAs. Both event tree analysis (ETA) and layer of protection analysis
(LOPA) have been used in the chemical industry. Event tree analysis, similar to FTA, is a
quantitative method that uses binary logic to understand how a failure propagation occurs
[7; 8]. Layer of protection analysis targets chemical production processes and is semiquantitative [9; 10].
Risk in early design (RED) is a contemporary risk assessment approach with
broad applications across numerous industries. RED uses quantitative methods to analyze
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both risks and potential failures. RED is the most recent method, and was created to
address the intrinsic knowledge requirement most previous methods faced [12, 13]. Each
will be reviewed in this section with a focus on how they support the lithography
chemical research in the semiconductor industry.
OSHA PHAs
FTA is an analysis technique that starts from a top event. Then determines how a
failure could have been caused by lower level events; FTA looks backwards into what
could have caused the top event [14]. Both logic gates and common symbols are used to
define these event types, much like a flow chart [15]. The probability of the top event is
then calculated from the basic event probabilities of the particular tree structure, which
adds quantitative value to an FTA [16, 15]. An FTA is helpful because it allows an
engineer to see how a series of events could connect and cause a failure. An FTA is also
good because it provides a clean view using a tree and thus helps with the complexity of
a chemical system. The usefulness of an FTA has been incorporated into the chemical
industry, focusing on chemical plant operations [17, 18, 19]. An FTA, however, would be
very difficult to complete before a chemical product is mature as several unknown
outcomes of the chemical process would need to be researched. Additionally, FTA
focuses only on one top event at a time, which means an entire tree must be generated for
a top event.

This approach becomes very cumbersome when trying to evaluate a

complex product that may have multiple failures [20].
HazOp is another commonly used method that helps identify hazards. During
HazOp, a knowledgeable team gathers and follows a structured list of guide-words to
analyze a process [21]. Through a series of meetings, the team works through the
process’ piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) to evaluate potential issues, their
causes, and possible solutions [15]. When a HazOp is complete, the entire process has
been evaluated and processes that deviate from the desired situation were examined. This
level of detailed analysis helps to thoroughly document and understand how a chemical
process works. However, much like a LOPA, HazOp focuses on the chemical production
process, and not the early research stage in which the chemical is developed [22, 23]. The
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HazOp process requires a team of experts with specialized knowledge and takes a large
amount of time to complete due to its thorough nature [22].
FMEA may be the most well-known risk assessment in the semiconductor
industry due to the connection between the semiconductor industry and the automotive
industry following the QS-9000 quality standard 11. The FMEA process analyzes the
intended function of the product and the information is separated into failure effects,
modes, and causes [24, 16, 15]. A numerical value is subjectively assigned to the
severity, the likelihood of occurrence, and the possibility of detection. These numbers
can then be multiplied to generate a risk priority number (RPN). RPNs then helps the
team to select the most important areas to mitigate. Both the logical process and the
quantitative results have made FMEA an easy tool to use when developing products [25].
The value of a FMEA, however, is limited to the intrinsic knowledge of the team.
Typically, a design FMEA is completed later in the design cycle, after product testing
knowledge has been gained.
Chemical Industry Risk Assessment Tools
ETA works in the opposite logical direction when compared to FTA. ETA begins
with a failure, and then propagates it forward through different binary pathways to a final
outcome [26]. The goal of the ETA is to evaluate all the possible outcomes that could
come from the initiating event [26]. ETA was first used by the nuclear industry as FTAs
were becoming too complex [20]. ETA condensed the analysis into a more concise
picture [20]. ETA provides a forward-looking process that identifies all of the possible
outcomes by using forward logic. It then analyzes both the likelihood and the
consequences that can result from a failure.

This method is advantageous because

multiple failures can be analyzed allowing the weakness of the system to be identified
[27, 28]. However, a very thorough understanding of how something works must first
exist so that the parts of an ETA can be built [29]. This is in part because fuzzy math is
used to represent subjective judgments [29]. Another drawback to using ETA is that
partial failures cannot be distinguished because the system is binary. Much like FTA,
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ETA only focuses on one initiating event at a time. Focusing on one event at a time
would create a very unmanageable approach for a chemical product.
LOPA, as its name implies, is a model that builds separate layers of protection.
These different layers serve as barriers to stop the progression of undesirable events [30].
The layers typically start with the chemical process and then progress through internal
protections in the chemical plant ending at an emergency response from the community.
LOPA is considered semi-quantitative as it does produce a numerical result. The
initiating event frequency numbers LOPA produces target orders of magnitude and are
considered imprecise [31]. LOPA is focused on chemical plant operations, helping break
down complex processes into simple layers so that protection methods can be viewed and
general decisions can be made [32]. LOPA, however, requires an experienced,
knowledgeable team focusing on only one cause and one consequence [31]. Though
LOPA is used in chemical production, it does not address the research stage when a
chemical is being developed. In fact, one reference about LOPA recommended that a
better method than building layers of protection is to develop a fundamentally better
chemical [30].
Contemporary Risk Assessment Tools
The RED method is targeted at identifying risks early in the design process,
before a prototype has been built, when the design is still in the concept stage. RED
connects either a product’s or a process’ basic functions, using a functional model, to a
historical database of failures using a standardized failure mode taxonomy [12, 13]. This
database contains a history of failure modes, their likelihoods, and their consequences.
Because the data on product failures comes from historical failures, inexperienced
engineers and designers alike can use RED to evaluate their products early in the design
phase [12, 13]. The use of matrices provides a simple approach that defines both function
and failure combinations that are then quantified by the database by both likelihood and
consequence, making RED a quantitative approach [12, 13]. For RED to generate a
robust analysis, the historical database must also be robust. Additionally users must be
trained to build functional models and interface with the software.
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Summary of Risk Tool Application Issues
The product design process must include a design risk tool for the chemical
industry, to prevent failures like the Sandy Bridge example. This tool needs to enable
potential chemical product failures to be identified and mitigated during the early states
of design when it is the least costly to do so. This tool must also be usable for any early
stage chemical design process and, thus, must be adaptable to any possible chemical
design project.
The above methods [ETA, FTA, LOPA, HazOp] are targeted during the later
production cycles instead of early in the design process. Additionally they require a team
with both sufficient knowledge and experience to develop a valuable result. These
limitations keep risk analysis from occurring until either late in the design stage or, in
some cases, all of the way into the production process. The RED methodology was
developed to address some of those shortcomings. It catalogs failures corresponding to
specific functions in a knowledge base that new designs can be screened against to help
assess risk [12, 13]. The product or process must be broken down into a standardized
functional model based on the function of each part. The functional model is then
compared to the knowledge base to determine both which functions have had failures and
what level of failure was recorded [12, 13]. RED can be used early in the design process,
immediately after a concept has been formed, so risks can be assessed before significant
resources have been dedicated to developing a product.

The RED method pulls

knowledge from a knowledge base instead of an experienced team, so any technical
professional who understands the function of his/her intended design can use the method.
However, the current version of the RED failure mode taxonomy is insufficient for new
chemical products. A broader taxonomy of failures is needed.
Chemical Failure Mode Taxonomy Addendum Methodology
The taxonomy for elecro-mechanical systems was developed to provide a
common classification of failure modes that would improve risk communication [33].
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Tumer et al. (2003) identified 51 failure modes. These failure modes were described
using the physical process that caused the failure, using a physics-based description [33].
This approach was used both to be consistent and to provide future users, such as
designers, with an accurate description of the nature of the failure. This research moved
towards standardizing a failure mode taxonomy.

The work paved the way to a

standardized failure mode taxonomy, automatic risk identification, and assessment of
electro-mechanical products using the RED analysis method [12, 13]. In turn, the failure
mode taxonomy was then broadened into chemical failure modes to extend the RED
methodology into the chemical industry [34]. Ombete (2009) added four chemical failure
modes to the taxonomy: catalytic effect, charge imbalance, diffusion, and free radical
formation. Both reviewing these failure modes with industry experts and examining
semiconductor failures are the first steps in enabling the semiconductor industry to
benefit from the recent advances in risk communication, identification, and assessment.
To broaden the taxonomy, 33 research papers were analyzed for chemical failures
of the lithography process. These papers focused on the chemical research into the
lithography process in the semiconductor industry, and were published through the
international society for optics and photonics (SPIE), The Electrochemical Society
(ECS), the Journal of Micromechanics and Microengineering, proceedings of the
International Conference on Semiconductor Technology, the Materials Research Society
symposium proceedings, Journal of Photopolymer Science and Technology, and Solid
State Technology. Research into the chemical failures of the lithography process allows
for the broadening of the failure taxonomy with a focus on a well-defined industry
process.
Each paper was analyzed for specific mentions of failures that were deviations
from the desired function. For example, according to Guerrero (2011, 79720Q-1), “As a
consequence of this polarity switch, mismatch of surface energies between layers occurs
which can be responsible for line collapse.” A line collapse failure is described and is
later shown in a SEM cross section of a line detaching from the surface. This example
demonstrates that line collapse was the failure mode, caused by a mismatch of surface
energies. Each paper was analyzed and the data was recorded.

The results were

examined to determine classifications of failure modes in the semiconductor industry.
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Chemical Failure Mode Taxonomy Details
The technology used to name the failures was not consistent throughout the 33
papers investigated. Therefore, a grouping process was used to define failure mode
representations for the updated descriptions. This research produced 18 failure modes
grouped into four primary identifier groups, as shown in Table 1. The failure modes
were the physical processes that connected the failure causes to the effects on either the
final lithography pattern or the later processes. The groups of these failure modes were
each described by a primary identifier, which is a clear and basic description of each
group [33]. The failure modes were grouped because some of the modes were either
similar or located at the same stage in the lithography process. The following section
describes each primary identifier as well as the related failure modes that resulted from
this process.
Table 1 Chemical failure mode results

Gas Release
The first primary failure mode identifier was gas release. Two similar failure
modes were also identified: sublimation and outgassing. These two modes were used
synonymously to mean the release of a gas from a coated material during the baking
process [35, 36]. Further investigation revealed that sublimation is a phase transition
process where a material moves from a solid to a gas without going through the liquid
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phase [37]. Outgassing is separate from sublimation, as outgassing is a release of a
trapped gas [38]. Outgassing was determined to be a failure mode because, in one case,
it linked the cause of an incorrect catalyst [35] to the effect of a deposition of
contamination on the hotplate lid. In the second example, the cause of outgassing was
that the chromophore was not completely attached to the polymer [36]. This second
example of outgassing again led to deposition of the chromophore on the hotplate lid.
This hotplate is part of the processing equipment. If it becomes contaminated, the
equipment becomes contaminated and must be either cleaned or replaced to maintain the
integrity of the manufacturing process. In extreme cases, the contamination can detach
and cause defects [36].
Feature Failure
The primary identifier of feature failures contained line roughness, critical
dimension (CD) change, and line collapse as failure modes.

Both a line and its

corresponding space are two of the fundamental features used to make ICs; two
additional features are contact holes and pillars [3]. Causes that lead to failures from line
roughness, CD change, or line collapse will then lead to either poor electrical effects or a
loss of the pattern. As an example, acid from a photo-acid generator (PAG) in the
underlayer diffused, causing line roughness [39]. This line roughness then affected the
performance of the device [40]. Critical dimension change had different causes, but had
the same effect as line roughness [41]. Complete loss of a line due to collapse was found
to be a very common failure mode with eight separate examples [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49]. The causes varied, and the effect was consistent with the feature falling over, as
shown in Figure 2.
Diffusion was a cause of line roughness, and possibly footing, residue and
scumming. These failure modes are discussed in the following sections, and have a
common connection with PAG and acid. Ombete, (2009) identified diffusion as a failure
mode. Diffusion was consistently found to be a cause, not a failure mode, in the research
performed in this study. For example, following the [cause → failure mode → effect]
logic, diffusion caused the acid to move into the line, increasing the roughness. This
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roughness then affected the device performance [39, 40]. Additionally, diffusion was
found to be integral to how chemically amplified photoresists perform [5, 3]. The
connection between diffusion and photoresist performance indicates that diffusion can be
beneficial. Therefore, this research points to diffusion as a cause of failure, not a failure
mode.

Fig 2 Line collapse example
Photos used by permission of Brewer Science, Inc. (Source: Guerrero et al., 2011)

Defects
The third primary identifier group was named defects, and contained several
different failure modes [35, 50, 51, 3, 52]. Bubbles, craters, pinholes, and bumps are
types of defects [51]. A defect is defined as a foreign object, disruption in the uniformity,
and consistency in the coating. These defects affect the device by causing either shorts or
opens in the circuit in later processing steps [51]. In addition to bubbles, bumps and
craters, defects such as fall-on particles, bridge, printing, and bottom layer defects were
also found [52]. An example of several defects is given in Figure 3.
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Fig 3 Defect examples
Photos used by permission of Brewer Science, Inc. (Source: Smith et al., 2010)

Interface Failures
The last primary identifier was interface failures. Interface failures are defined as
a failure at the interface between two layers and are usually between two lines. 14
examples were found during the literature review [42, 43, 44, 53, 54, 41, 39, 55, 45, 56,
47, 57, 58, 59]. This group of interface failures consisted of residue, scumming, footing,
and undercut failures. Residue was defined as a film remaining after the development
step. This film is typically very thin and difficult to measure [59, 54, 47]. Residue is
caused by improper processing such as, baking at either too high of a temperature [59,
54], using the wrong components, or by selecting an incorrect component ratio, such as
too much PAG [47] or by the choice of the substrate [54]. The effect of residue is a
limited process window, or pattern transfer errors [59, 54].
Scumming is another failure mode. Like residue, scumming, is usually between
two lines. Scumming was driven by improper processing conditions and components
were to blame, such as lack of acid [43]. Scumming was also caused by intermixing of
the two layers [60]. Figure 4 shows an example of scumming, which is the material
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remaining between the features. Because scumming exists, the pattern is incomplete and
cannot be transferred. The pattern transfer process is thus affected.

Fig 4 Scumming example
Photos used by permission of Brewer Science, Inc. (Source: Lowes et al., 2011)

Footing is a slight flare at the interface between the photoresist pattern and the
layer underneath. The flare looks like a small foot sticking out at the base of the feature,
as shown in Figure 5. Footing had several different causes, such as too little diffusion
[42], wrong BARC thickness [44, 41, 57, 58], incompatibility of the two layers [53],
improper absorbance of the BARC [41], improper acid loading was off [39], incorrect
bake temperature [45], misaligned activation energy of the BARC and photoresist [47]
and intermixing of the layers [60, 59]. Footing is an improper pattern that will not
transfer correctly, causing device failure.
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Fig 5 Footing example
Photo used by permission of Brewer Science, Inc. (Source: Guerrero et al., 2009)

An undercut is a decrease in the critical dimension at the base of a feature. When
looked at through a cross section (see Figure 6), an undercut appears to be either a
necking of an indentation. This failure mode is caused by thermal energy deviations, such
as a bake temperature that is too low, a bake time is too short, or, conversely, the
combination of a high bake temperature and a short bake time [55].

A low bake

temperature is also the source of undercut [36, 59]. Much like footing, the undercut of a
line is an incomplete pattern that does not transfer correctly and will cause device failure.

Fig 6 Undercut example
Photo used by permission of Brewer Science, Inc. (Source: Neef & Thomas 2007)
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Case Study
An industrial research paper providing information on a chemical failure was
examined to validate the taxonomy. This paper was not used for the development of the
taxonomy. The paper was reviewed for specific mentions of failures, which were
deviations from the intended functions. The selected paper reported an advanced double
patterning lithography process used in the semiconductor industry [61]. Bae (2009) in
particular reported on a double patterning process that involved printing a pattern, then
using a process to stabilize that pattern so that subsequent processing, including
additional patterning, could be performed on top of the first pattern, and not affect the
first pattern. If the pattern changes during the curing process, then the desired function of
a stable pattern is not reached and the pattern is considered a failure.
The double patterning process introduced a new curing agent after the first
lithography step. The curing process involved both thermal and chemical approaches,
with the goal of locking the first pattern so the second pattern could be applied.
Understanding this, Bae (2009) discussed two chemical failure modes: CD change and
line edge roughness. The CD change was caused by both the chemical and the thermal
curing processes. The CD change failure came from both a growth of the CD and a
shrinking of the CD. The CD change in Bae’s study, was caused by the curing agent. The
CD change in Jurajda, 2009, one of the sources used above to identify CD change as a
chemical failure mode, was caused by a BARC thickness change.
Line edge roughness was the second failure mode covered by Bae. This failure
mode is caused by acid diffusion. During the chemical process, acid can diffuse into the
line so that the roughness of the line increases through processing [61]. Line edge
roughness was also identified in the chemical failure mode taxonomy above. The cause
of line edge roughness from Xu, 2009 was also acid diffusion.
For the chemical failure modes identified in Bae’s study, CD change and line
edge roughness were both covered in the chemical failure mode taxonomy above. This
case study shows by example that the chemical failure mode taxonomy assembled in the
paper accurately represents common failure modes found in the semiconductor materials
industry.
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Summary
This research fortified the failure mode taxonomy by including chemical failures
from the lithography process in the semiconductor industry. Eighteen separate failure
modes were identified and grouped into four primary identifiers. Definitions of each
failure mode were obtained from a documented source following the physical description
method previously published. Each was then described, and pictures for all of the failure
modes were supplied for reference. Except for residue, which had not been captured with
a picture.
The chemical failure mode taxonomy that was generated was then tested using a
case study. The analysis of the case study resulted in its failure modes matching two of
those in the new taxonomy. These case study results indicated that the method is robust
and the chemical failure mode taxonomy is thorough.
Thus, this research will enable a risk analysis in high technology based products.
This analysis can help both engineers and designers examine their products using
historical failure data. The taxonomy is a living database that grows with time, adding
increased value as more high quality information is added to it. Further work is needed
to support the growth of the taxonomy in chemical failures and other technical areas.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present a methodology to identify risks in the
chemical product development process.

This work will enable comprehensive risk

analysis in products that have a chemical based subsystem, such as those used in the
lithography process in the semiconductor industry.

Previous work has broadened the

failure mode taxonomy used to aid risk identification in electromechanical products to
include chemical failures from the semiconductor industry. The current work focuses on
leveraging the broadened failure mode taxonomy and historical failure cases to
automatically generate potential risks of chemical based products.
1

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present a methodology to identify risks in the

chemical product development process. Chemicals become materials and parts that
combine to create value for the end user, and in many cases the product value comes
from the basic material design.

For example, a capacitor is a simple electronic

component that consists of parallel plates with a dielectric1. The plate and dielectric
design determine the electrical characteristics of a capacitor, and if one of the plates is an
electrolyte, then the capacitor is called an electrolytic capacitor. Thus the design of the
electrolyte material becomes critical to the capacitor performance.

Aluminum

electrolytic capacitors are used in consumer electronics to smooth out the flow of
electricity and in 2003 the ABIT Computer Corporation used Aluminum electrolytic
capacitors containing an electrolyte that was missing key chemical additives in its

25
formulation2. The missing additive made the electrolyte chemically unstable when
charged, and caused the electrolyte to generate hydrogen gas, resulting in reports of the
electrolyte leaking out of the capacitor and exploding capacitors2.

Lien Yan, the

company who manufactured the electrolyte saw a 30% drop in orders as a result of the
failures2. The design of the electrolyte was incorrect, causing the material to fail, which
led to capacitor failure and thus the motherboard to stop working, which in turn shut the
computer down. Such a small part of the overall system, lack of the proper additives in
an electrolyte, was enough to cause the whole system to fail.
Chemicals permeate everyday life, from the dyes in textiles to the materials in the
photolithography process, used to make semiconductor devices, often called chips. The
fundamental process that both enables and limits semiconductor device fabrication is the
photolithography process. This paper focuses on identifying chemical risks in the
photolithography process used in the semiconductor industry. Photolithography involves
reducing, then transferring a pattern precisely for several million times over a device
generation.

Fundamentally, photolithography is a series of chemical reactions

interspaced by optical, thermal and physical processes. Figure 1 shows a very basic
process flow to create a simple line and space pattern. Polymer films such as bottom
anti-reflective coatings (BARC) and photoresists are coated onto the wafer, which is then
baked. The baking process either crosslinks or cures the films to stabilize them. The
wafer is transferred to an exposure tool and the pattern is transferred through the optics to
the polymer films on the substrate, causing a photochemical reaction. The substrate is
then transferred and baked; causing a chemical amplification of the photochemical
reaction, which creates and diffuses acid. Then a basic developer is coated over the
wafer, causing an acid-base reaction that resolves the exposed pattern. The wafer is
rinsed with water to clean it and further processing, including additional chemical
reactions, are used to complete the device. Photolithography, in essence, is a series of
chemical interactions and reactions that combine to form a pattern on the wafer.
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Figure 1: Photolithography process
Graphic used by permission of Brewer Science, Inc.

Chemists, engineers and lithographers who deal with risks associated with
photolithography chemicals in the photolithography process will be better prepared and
will have a more cost effective method of managing risks. The Chemical Risk in Early
Design (C-RED) method uses chemical research information that documented chemical
failures, cataloged them and used that structured information to recommend possible risks
that researchers and engineers need to consider. C-RED followed the method developed
by Granthan-Lough, which was based on identifying and determining risks in electromechanical designs, by connecting historical product failures to a product’s function3.
2

Background

2.1

Recent Material Failures
Along with chemical design, the material selection early in the design process can

be a source of failure, such as the packaging used in connecting graphics chips to a
computer system. Micron scale wires have been traditionally used to make the electrical
connections between the chip and the solder balls on the larger package4. The more
recent method is to place tiny bumps of solder on the chip’s active surface, then flip the
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chip over to connect to the larger device4. A cross section view of a wire bond and flip
chip is shown in Figure 2. The overall package of a flip-chip is smaller and has better
electrical performance than a wire-bond package, however manual replacement of a flipchip is not an option and thermal management and thermal effects are more challenging
in a clip-chip design, requiring careful material design4,5. In the flip chip package the
small solder bumps that connect the device chip to the substrate must transmit electricity,
manage thermal energy and provide mechanical stability. To help with this, an underfill
is used to provide support and minimize solder fatigue on the flip chip4,5. Through 2007
and 2008 Nvidia produced graphic flip chips with improperly designed solder bumps and
underfills5,6. The solder chosen was a brittle high lead material with poor adhesion to the
eutectic pads it was mated to, combined with an underfill material that became soft (low
Tg) at a low temperature of 90°C5. As the graphics chip was thermally stressed, this
caused the underfill to soften and then the brittle solder bumps broke from their bonds5.
With the graphics chips disconnected, the computer screen went permanently black for
consumers5,6. This chip failure forced Nvidia to take a $196 million reserve to cover
repair and replacement costs7, followed by Nvidia loosing 3 billion in market value,
resulting in a securities fraud lawsuit6. Sources speculated that the poor choice of solder
and underfill occurred very early in the design process, and due to the complex design
and testing required to verify devices, it made the problem difficult to solve once
consumers discovered it5.

Figure 2: Comparison of wire bonding and flip chip
The decisions the Nvidia engineers made when selecting materials for the solder
and underfill incorporated a high level of risk5. The risky material decision led to
negative consequences for the consumer.

Risk is defined as the chance that an
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undesirable event can occur and the consequences of all its possible outcomes

8,9

. If the

risk is not identified and mitigated, the failure of a semiconductor device can result in an
enormous cost, similar to the capacitor and very close to the graphics chip example. A
dramatic example of a semiconductor industry failure was Intel’s recent issue with the
Sandy Bridge graphics processor chip. The chip suffered a failure due to a gate oxide
that was too thin, resulting in current leaking10. The gate oxide separates the gate
terminal from the source and drain in a transistor and serves as a dielectric as shown in
Figure 3. A voltage is applied to the gate, allowing electrons to flow from the source to
the drain through a channel between the two and under the gate. If the gate oxide is too
thin, electrons can channel through the oxide to the gate causing current to leak through
the device, causing electrical failure of the transistor. Roughly 8 million chips shipped
from Intel with too thin of a gate oxide in 2001, this failure cost Intel $300 million in lost
sales and $700 million in repairs10. This example emphasized how a failure can progress
through the semiconductor design process, consuming resources until it is identified.

Figure 3: Semiconductor transistor design
The chemical industry uses several risk assessment methods. Several of these
methods focus on chemical manufacturing processes since they are connected to the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) PSM standard Title 29 CFR
1910.119. This federal regulation requires chemical plants to conduct process hazards
analysis (PHA)11. PHAs are methodologies that follow systematic approaches to find
both hazards and deviations, and are defined by OSHA as a systematic effort designed to
identify the significance of hazards associated with either the processing or handling of
highly hazardous materials11. Along with OSHA, many other entities have PHA
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guidance. These entities are detailed in government regulations such as 21 CFR 120.7, 29
CFR 1910.119, 40 CFR 68, FAA-DI-SAFT-101, DOT-FTA-MA-26-5005-00-01 and
DOE Order 5480.30.
In this work, focus was placed on PHAs documented either under OSHA
regulations or had documented use within the industry so that a pattern of legitimate use
could be established. The PHAs examined in this study were taken from the code of
federal regulations published by OSHA, and included fault tree analysis (FTA), hazard
and operability study (HazOp) and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). These
methods are listed by OSHA as tools that can be used in industry to assist in both
determining and understanding hazards and potential failure modes in a chemical
process11. Fault tree analysis is a quantitative method that uses binary logic to understand
how a failure propagation occurs12,13. A hazard and operability study, or a hazard and
operability review, targets chemical production processes; these studies are semiquantitative14,15. FMEA is a quantitative method designed for products with several
parts, such as automobiles16. FMEA in particular is very common in the semiconductor
industry because semiconductor devices are used in automobiles, and for many years
there has been a drive to follow standards connected to the automotive industry, including
FMEA recommendations16.
Risk assessment tools with published use in industry were also analyzed. These
included event tree analysis, layer of protection analysis, and risk in early design. Event
tree analysis (ETA), similar to FTA, is a quantitative method that uses binary logic to
understand how failure propagation occurs12,13. Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)
targets chemical production processes by assessing the protection of the layers used to
mitigate risks in the process14,15.
Risk in early design (RED) is a contemporary risk assessment approach with
broad uses across several industries. RED uses quantitative methods to analyze both risks
and potential failures connected to the function of the design. RED is the most recent
method, and was created to address the intrinsic knowledge requirement most previous
methods faced8. Each will be reviewed in the following sections.
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2.2 OSHA Recommended PHAs
FTA is an analysis technique that starts from a top or initiating event. It looks
backwards to what could have caused the top event by determining the connections
between the lower level events17. An FTA is helpful because it provides an engineer with
a simple visual mechanism to see how a series of complex events could connect and
cause a failure. FTAs have been incorporated into the chemical industry, focusing on
chemical plant operations18,19,20. An FTA, however, would be very difficult to complete
before a chemical product is mature, as the multitude of unknown outcomes from the
chemical process would need to be determined. Additionally, FTA focuses only on one
top event at a time, which means an entire tree must be generated for each top event.
This approach becomes very cumbersome when trying to evaluate a complex product that
may have multiple failures21.
HazOp is a commonly used method that helps identify hazards in chemical
industries. During HazOp, a knowledgeable team gathers and follows a structured list of
guide-words22. Through a series of meetings, the team works through the process to
evaluate potential issues, their causes, and possible solutions23. However, much like a
LOPA, HazOp focuses on the chemical production process, and not the early research
stage in which the chemical is developed24,25. The HazOp process requires a team of
experts with specialized knowledge and takes a large amount of time to complete due to
its thorough nature24.
FMEA may be the most well-known risk assessment tool in the semiconductor
industry, due to the connection between the semiconductor and the automotive industries
following the QS-9000 quality standard. The FMEA process analyzes the intended
function of the product and the information is separated into failure effects, modes, and
causes23,26,27. Both the logical process and the quantitative results have made FMEA a
straightforward tool to use when developing products28. The value of a FMEA is limited
to the intrinsic knowledge of the team and it is typically completed later in the design
cycle, after product design and testing knowledge has been acquired.
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2.3

Additional Risk Assessment Tools Used In The Chemical Industry
ETA works in the opposite logical direction when compared to FTA. ETA begins

with a failure, and then propagates it forward through different binary pathways to a final
outcome29. The goal of the ETA is to evaluate all the possible outcomes that could come
from the initiating event and condense the analysis into a more concise picture21,29. This
method is advantageous because multiple failures can be analyzed allowing the weakness
of the system to be identified30,31. However, a very thorough understanding of how
something works must first exist so that the parts of an ETA can be built32. Much like
FTA, ETA only focuses on one initiating event at a time. Focusing on one event at a time
would create a very unmanageable approach for a chemical product.
LOPA, as its name implies, is a model that builds separate layers of protection.
These different layers serve as barriers to stop the progression of undesirable events33.
The layers typically start with the chemical process and then progress through internal
protections in the chemical plant ending at an emergency response from the community.
LOPA is focused on chemical plant operations, helping break down complex processes
into simple layers so that protection methods can be viewed and general decisions can be
made34. LOPA, however, requires an experienced, knowledgeable team focusing on only
one cause and one consequence35. Though LOPA is used in chemical production, it does
not address the research stage when a chemical is being developed. In fact, one reference
about LOPA recommended that a better method than building layers of protection is to
develop a fundamentally better chemical33.
2.4

Risk In Early Design
The RED method is targeted at identifying risks early in the design process,

before a prototype has been built, when the design is still in the concept stage. RED
connects either a product’s or a process’ basic functions, using a functional model, to a
historical database of failures using a standardized failure mode taxonomy36,37. This
database contains a history of failure modes, their likelihoods, and their consequences.
Because the data on product failures comes from historical failures, inexperienced
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engineers and designers alike can use RED to evaluate their products early in the design
phase36,37. The use of matrices provides a simple approach that defines both function and
failure combinations that are then quantified by the database by both likelihood and
consequence, making RED a quantitative approach36,37. For RED to generate a robust
analysis, the historical database must also be robust. Additionally users must be trained to
build functional models and interface with the software.
One of the differences of RED compared to the PRAs descried above such as
ETA, FTA, LOPA and HazOp, is that RED can be used early in the design cycle when
only a product’s concept exits. A strength of RED compared to HazOp and FMEA is that
RED does not require a team with extensive knowledge and experience to develop a
valuable result. The RED method pulls information from a knowledge base instead of an
experienced team, so any technical professional who understand the function of the
intended design can use the method. RED connects a product’s or process’s basic
functions, using a functional model, to a historical database of failures using a failure
taxonomy36,37. This mapping is accomplished by developing a functional model, which is
a series of basic functions that are used as a common interface between the product and
the database, using the taxonomy. The database contains a history of failure modes, their
likelihoods and consequences.
A taxonomy establishes a consistent resource to future users by providing an
accurate and straightforward description of the nature of the failure. The taxonomy for
chemical products was started by Ombete in 2009 and is shown in the top of Table 138.
Washburn broadened this taxonomy in 2012, which is shown in the lower half of Table
139. The failure modes were described using the physical processes that the research
showed caused the failure.
Once the groundwork of the taxonomy is laid and the functional model of the
product or process is built, the correct functions can be selected, and the rest of the RED
process can be applied. The RED process uses a matrix approach to map the collected
function’s potential failures, likelihood and consequences. The function-component
matrix (EC) consists of the product’s functions and the individual components of the
product. The component-failure matrix (CF) is composed of the
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Table 1: Chemical failure mode taxonomy38,39

product’s components and the potential failure modes. These two matrices are multiplied
to produce the function-failure matrix (EF), as shown in equation (1).
EC x CF = EF

(1)

To help categorize the history of failures in the database, basic heuristics were
produced to guide the user in selecting the correct mapping combinations36,37. The
selection is based on how the product is used, and where it is in an overall system. The
description below details each heuristic, and Table 2 provides a view of where each
heuristic resides36,37.
System Level:

During this stage of design the product as a whole is
considered, and the question is asked, “Is this a risky product?”

Subsystem Level: During this stage of design the pieces and subsystems of a
product are considered, and the question is asked, “Which part
has the most risk?”
Human Centric:

A human centric product is one in which a human is central to
its operation.
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Unmanned:

An unmanned product is one that does not directly interact with
a human during its intended operation.
Table 2: RED heuristics36,37

The consequence and likelihood calculations are shown in Table 3. The L1
likelihood calculation focuses on subsystem designs, where L2 is targeted at the system
level.

The C1 consequence calculation is a human centric product and C2 is an

unmanned system36,37.
Table 3: RED heuristics36,37

The use of matrices provides a simple approach to define function and failure
combinations, which are then quantified by the database, using both likelihood and
consequence. The results of the analysis are produced in a fever chart, which serves as a
clear and concise way to communicate the results. The color-coding follows a stoplight
pattern, with the green meaning low risk, yellow meaning moderate risk and the red
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meaning high risk, as shown in Figure 4. The numbers in the cells correspond to the
likelihood and consequence data from the historical failures in the database36,37.

Figure 4: Fever chart example
3

Applying The C-RED Method
The C-RED method requires a series of discrete steps that build on the RED

method. These steps guide the user through a structured process, step by step. The RED
method uses matrix algebra to combine the functions of the system or sub-system, the
components, and failure modes to the frequency and severity of the failures. Though the
calculations are the same, the heuristics change. Most chemicals are used as part of a
process, or sub-system, that connects to a larger system used to make a final product. So
for chemical sub-systems, the focus on severity changes from a person to a process or
equipment.
Step 1: The first step is to build a database of historical failures, using a common
taxonomy. To do this a large number of failures must be identified that have chemical
failure modes or chemical subsystems that were the failure mode. The failure cause,
mode and effect must be separated. Then the failure mode is extracted, and recorded
following the failure mode taxonomy38,39.
Step 2: After the failure modes have been identified and recorded, they are ranked. The
ranking focuses on how severe the impact is, with a low impact being 1 and a high
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severity being 5. Table 4 shows how the consumer based severity table was adapted for
use with chemicals and chemical processes. The focus of the severity changed from a
person to the customer’s process or equipment that would be using the chemical or
chemical process.
Table 4: Severity table for chemicals and chemical processes

Step 3: The matrices are now created using the data from previous steps. The EC matrix
documents which functions are connected to list of components. The CF matrix connects
the components with the researched failure modes, focusing on how many modes were
documented to create the frequency. The CF’ is like the CF except that it records
severity instead of frequency. The equation (1) is used to create the EF matrix, which
creates the failure modes to the functions.
Step 4: Once the groundwork is completed, a functional model is built that describes the
process that will be analyzed. The steps are defined for the process, and are then broken
down into individual functions that are connected using different energy flows. The
functions are structured in a verb and then object connection, such as transport solid.
Step 5: The functions are then extracted from the model and entered into the C-RED
database. The database maps the functions to the risk likelihood and consequence. For
this analysis and unmanned sub-system mapping was selected, since the processes do not
require human interaction and are part of larger process. Equation (2) shows the L1-prod,
which is selected for sub-system designs. Equation (3) shows the C2-ave aug which is
used for unmanned cases. The calculation results of (2) produce the likelihood that a
function will fail from one of the documented failure modes. The results of equations (3)
provide the consequence of the failure mode.
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(2)

(3)
Step 6: Once the calculations are complete, the results must be communicated. The
failure modes, likelihoods and consequences are communicated in two ways. A report is
produced in the form of a table that lists the data. A fever chart is also produced as
shown in Figure 3, which provides a stoplight color-coded grid of consequence and
likelihood of the failures.
4

A Case Study
The purpose of the case study was to validate the C-RED method, using the pre-

established failure mode taxonomy. Wang 2012 was selected for the case study, and
reported on the causes of blob defects, which are defects caused by residual material left
behind after the develop process40. Wang et. al. developed a solution to the defect
problem by altering the chemistry of the layers used in the lithography process, which
suited the chemical nature of C-RED very well.
Steps one through three were previously completed39. The next step is to build a
functional model. So one was built for the case study based on the photolithography
process that is used to pattern semiconductor substrates, the last step is the developing the
wafer. Figure 5 shows the functional model of the develop process, listing some of the
functions in the robot flow and the functions in the wafer flow. Four functions were
identified in the develop process; transport solid, coat solid, store fluid and transport
fluid.
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Figure 5: Functional model of the develop process
The goal of the case study was to verify that C-RED would identify failures in an
actual case. The case study identified blob defects in the develop step of the lithography
process, and blob defect was also in the taxonomy from previous research39. If the CRED method works, blob defect should appear through the analysis. Table 5 shows the
results of the C-RED analysis after completing step 5, along with the fever chart in Figure
6. The C-RED analysis did produce blob as a failure mode, connected with the function
of transferring a liquid. Blob defects had a low likelihood of occurring at level one, and a
medium consequence at level three.
The analysis also produced two failure modes that were fives on the likelihood
and four on the consequence scale. Both were line collapse, though from two different
functions. Line collapse was not mentioned in Wang 2012, nor was any of the other
failure modes. Since Wang 2012 focused on blob defects, other failures may have
occurred and were not published. Through an interview with Wang it was learned that
the line-collapse, footing and microbridging occur regularly when developing lithography
processes he has worked on41. However, they were not part of the 2012 study and Wang
could not comment on the connection of failures outside of blobs for the materials and
processes the case study researched41.
The C-RED process did identify blob defects. The function of transferring a
liquid was also consistent with the research of Wang 2012, “… the blob defects are due
to the aggregation of the resist components during alkaline developer development and
DI water rinse steps, and the aggregated resist components then fall back onto the wafer
surface forming the blobs. This mechanism is also referred to as pH shock or reduced
zeta potential of the resist components in the developing/rinsing transition stage.”
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Wang’s research showed that blobs formed during the develop and rinse steps, when
liquid developer and liquid water were flowing across the surface of the wafer, and the
taxonomy associated blob defects with the transfer of liquid. This connection shows
consistency in the research methods and a real world case study, and demonstrates that
the taxonomy and C-RED method was verified as effective in identifying failure modes.
Table 5: C-RED report for case study

Figure 6: Fever chart for case study
5

Summary
The goal of this paper was to present a methodology to identify risks in the

chemical product development process. The purpose was to enable comprehensive risk
analysis in technology based products. Products that have a chemical based subsystem,
such as those used in the lithography process in the semiconductor industry were the
specific focus.
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A review of the current risk analysis methods showed that there is a need for a
tool early in the chemical design process to understand and mitigate risk. Past work in
taxonomy research was used as a basis. A case study was then selected, and analyzed40.
A functional model was built to show the develop process that Wang, 2012 referenced.
The functions were then run through the C-RED analysis software, and the results
analyzed. The blob defect discussed in Wang 2012 was produced by the C-RED
software, along with additional failure modes, verifying the effectiveness of both the
taxonomy and the C-RED process.
Thus, this research has produced a risk analysis in high technology based
products. This analysis can help both engineers and designers examine their products
using historical failure data. The taxonomy is a living database that grows with time,
adding increased value as more high quality information is added to it. Further work is
needed to support the growth of the taxonomy in chemical failures and other technical
areas.
6
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SECTION

2. CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this research was to both fortify the failure mode taxonomy and to
also include chemical failures and then verify that and to present a methodology to
identify risks in the chemical product development process. The first paper researched
and presented a taxonomy for chemical based systems. The second paper presented the
C-RED methodology, including a case study, demonstrating the process.
The value of the C-RED methodology is directly connected to how broad the
failure mode taxonomy is. Further research is needed to broaden the taxonomy. Further
work could also focus on proving depth to the taxonomy by recording the cause of the
failures. The cause may be more valuable to chemical designers, as they are able to
chemical the chemical formula and process to adjust for known causes. This is because it
is more difficult to adjust a chemical or chemical process to mitigate a failure mode, than
it is to prevent it in the first place.
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